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This paper examines public preferences regarding privacy implications of internet surveillance. The study
was based on a pan-European survey and included a stated preference discrete choice experiment
(SPDCE) involving the choice of an Internet Service Provider (ISP) offering varying levels of storage,
access and sharing of internet activity, continuous surveillance and privacy enhancing technologies. The
survey obtained 16,463 individual responses across the European Union's 27 member-states1. Re-
spondents expressed highest levels of concern about: Internet facilitated crime, namely using the
internet to share and publish child pornography (68.2%); individual data protection and security threats
e i.e., personal information not being handled in a legitimate way (62%); computer viruses (61.4%) and
ﬁnally the theft of ﬁnancial data or identity (61.4%). Such levels of concern affect trust in the Internet:
27.7% of respondents trusted websites for information exchange and a similar ﬁgure, 30.7% reported they
trust websites for business transactions. Given this context, following our analysis of preferences, on
average, respondents were more likely to choose an ISP that would not store any internet activity, would
retain any data for up to 1 month and would not share data with anyone else. Interestingly, respondents
did recognise the potential beneﬁt for continuous state-surveillance (by the police), but only under an
appropriate accountable legal basis. Also, respondents were in favour of an array of privacy enhancing
technologies that would enhance their privacy when using the Internet. Finally, the analysis shows that
in some cases, signiﬁcant differences in preferences across countries and socio-economic characteristics
suggest that individual privacy-preferences do vary across cultural/national settings, age, gender and
education level.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The Internet has become an increasingly necessary and impor-
tant facet of everyday life. In 2015, 83% of households in the Eu-
ropean Union's 28 Member States (EU28) had internet access, an
increase of 28 percentage points compared to 2007 ﬁgures
(Eurostat, 2016a). As of June 2016, there were 412 million Internet
users in the EU28 who used the Internet every day (Internet World
Stats, 2016) and according to e-commerce statistics, two thirds of
these users made online purchases of goods or services (Eurostat,
2016b). However, EU ﬁgures show that only 22% of EuropeansPlanning, Cardiff University,
, CF10 3WA, Wales, UK.
lou).
oming member of the Euro-
r Ltd. This is an open access articlehad full trust in e-commerce sites.
Criminals and terrorists have also taken an interest in the
Internet for nefarious purposes. Cyber criminals seek to exploit the
increasing economic importance of use of the Internet through
perpetrating fraud, identity theft and other forms of economic
crime against individuals and businesses. According to Symantec's
Internet Security Threat Report, the total cost of cybercrime in 2016
was estimated at US$575 billion (ISTR, 2016). Terrorists have also
been quick to exploit the potential of the Internet. Groups such as
Islamic State/Daesh and others use the Internet to recruit, radicalise
and incite terrorism, post videos of atrocities online and employ
encrypted communications platforms like Telegram (Inayatullah &
Milojevic, 2015).
Latterly, nation-states are developing increasingly sophisticated
capabilities in cyberspace to enhance traditional espionage, further
national security objectives or maintain the resilience of critical
infrastructure (e.g Stoddart, 2016). Governments also employ theseunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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economic impact of the misuse of the Internet by criminals and
terrorists. This surveillance has the potential to encroach upon the
privacy and convenience of Internet users. For example the UK's
'Draft Investigatory Powers Bill' (Home Ofﬁce, 2015) involves hav-
ing the details of users' browsing history stored so they are easily
accessible to police and other security forces in the event of a state
of emergency being declared. The monitoring and interception of
Internet communications is regarded by law enforcement and se-
curity authorities as an essential tool in addressing these threats. As
a case in point, in investigating the recent attacks in Brussels and
Paris, the authorities were reportedly hampered by the lack of
surveillance capabilities, a framework for sharing information and
investigatory powers (Politico, 2015; The Guardian, 2016). While it
is impossible to say whether these capabilities would have neces-
sarily prevented such attacks, their absence is often lamented by
security authorities. With these kind of threats and the constantly
evolving technological pace of change, law enforcement and in-
telligence agencies are increasingly concerned about ‘going dark’ e
i.e., losing their ability to lawfully intercept and monitor Internet
based communications (Berkman, 2016). Ultimately, the authorities
charged with security have to reconcile these two competing in-
terests (Waldron, 2003).
This process is not necessarily visible to the end-user of the
security infrastructure (i.e., everyday citizens) since generally the
competing drivers of security and privacy that must be reconciled
are either implicit or difﬁcult for the layman to fully understand. In
democratic societies, citizens are only infrequently able to exercise
their choice in how this challenge is solved through voting in
different political parties. The complexity of the exercise of choice
between different security mechanisms is also due in part to the
nature of security as a public good and the debate about whether is
possible to meaningfully exercise choice between different pro-
viders of national security.
In the face of the security rationale for surveillance offered by
governments, there is evidence to suggest that users are becoming
interested (albeit over the short term) in implementing privacy
controls to redress the balance (Preibusch, 2015). One way users
may exercise control over their personal information is through
tools that can enhance or improve their online privacy, known as
Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs). PETs can be deﬁned as
technologies that aim to preserve the privacy of individuals or
groups of individuals (Heurix, Zimmerman, Neubauer, & Fenz,
2015). Examples of PETs include technology that can anonymise
internet usage (e.g. The Onion Router or ToR), protect communi-
cations through encryption or anonymise data.
Nonetheless, the employment of quantitative methodologies to
better investigate, understand and measure citizens' preferences
for public goods like security should not be discounted. Such ap-
proaches have been successfully employed across a number of
comparable subject areas including health (Hall, Viney, Haas, &
Louviere, 2004) social care (Netten et al., 2012) and value of
travel-time savings studies (Hess, Daly, Dekker, Cabral, & Batley,
2017).
Previous studies aimed at investigating individual preferences
for privacy, internet surveillance and disclosure of personal infor-
mation offer ﬁndings that are difﬁcult to generalise or compare
with other studies. These differences may be due to limitations in
study design; most studies, for example, employ convenience-
based samples such as university students (Hui, Teo, & Lee,
2007), capture behavioural intentions to disclose personal infor-
mation via a unidimensional trade-off with a monetary payment
(Acquisti, John, & Loewenstein, 2013) or its association with self-
reported scales of privacy concern (Pavlou, 2011). Previous re-
views of the literature have shown that the majority of studies onprivacy of personal information come from the United States
(Belanger & Crossler, 2011 cited in; Pavlou, 2011) thus providing
little evidence about individuals' preferences across other coun-
tries. Most importantly, the majority of studies refer to individual
privacy and personal-information disclosure intentions in the
context of e-commerce (Potoglou, Palacios, & Feijoo, 2015) and not
state-surveillance practices and individuals' preferences for privacy
enhancing technologies.
This paper addresses several of these research gaps. To address
the issues of convenience and the US-focused nature of samples in
previous studies, this study reports ﬁndings using a broadly
representative sample of individuals from across the European
Union's 27 Member States (EU27) according to age, gender and
geographical region. Respondent preferences were captured via a
Stated Preference Discrete Choice Experiment (SPDCE) experiment,
a survey-based methodology. The SPDCE is the most widely used
preference elicitation technique for determining the factors driving
individual choices (Hensher, Rose, & Greene, 2005) and has been
widely employed in a number of subject areas including health and
healthcare (Viney, Lancsar, & Louviere, 2002), environmental
valuation (Bateman et al., 2002), transport (Hess et al., 2017), and
marketing (Allenby, Shively, Yang, & Garratt, 2004). The SPDCE in
this study involved hypothetical scenarios concerning the choice of
an Internet Service Provider (ISP). The ISP choice context was also
different relative to numerous studies employing e-commerce
scenarios, for example, to examine individual privacy and security
preferences when using the Internet. Finally, the SPDCE approach
allowed the analysis of preferences beyond the traditional model of
examining responses to a single dimension of privacy against
monetary exchange. In particular, this study offers insights about an
array of relevant privacy-related dimensions including the level of
storage of internet-users' activity, retention of this information and
sharing as well as privacy enhancing technologies.
2. Theoretical background
Information privacy has been studied under different deﬁni-
tions, attributes, contexts and themes including through the prism
of law, management, economics, psychology marketing and infor-
mation systems (Pavlou, 2011). In the context of online communi-
cations and e-commerce, online privacy is often seen as being
inextricably linked to identity and the policies related to the use of
user data (Angriawan & Thakur, 2008). As such, aspects regarding
how individuals perceive privacy and control information about
themselves are often an important theme in the debate. In
contemporary life, there are increasing pressures on this control
(Thierer, 2013). These can be imposed externally by governments
for security reasons as indicated above or businesses for economic
beneﬁt. They may also be internally driven; for example, the desire
to construct and express identity (Boyd & Heer, 2006).
Empirical research efforts concerning individual-level online
privacy can be consolidated into the Antecedents, Privacy Concerns,
Outcomes (APCO) model proposed by Smith, Dinev, and Xu (2011).
As shown in Fig. 1, individual privacy-concerns within the APCO
model are determined via antecedents such as age, gender, social
awareness, personal experience and trust (e.g. Bergstr€om, 2015;
Dinev & Hart, 2006; Smith, Milberg, & Burke, 1996). Privacy con-
cerns are routinely captured via psychometric scales including the
Concern for Information Privacy (Smith et al., 1996) and Internet
Users' Information Privacy Concerns (IUIPC, Malhotra, Kim, &
Agarwal, 2004).
Another component in the APCO model links privacy concerns
with behavioural intentions such as individuals' willingness to
disclose personal information. Behavioural intentions are subject to
the assumption that individuals' reactions (or stated intentions) are
Antecedents Privacy Concerns
Behavioural reactions
(including disclosure)
Privacy
Calculus
Risks/Costs Benefits
Fig. 1. The APCO Macro model (Smith et al., 2011).
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ﬂects a decision-making process e a calculus or trade-off e under
which individuals weigh the risks/costs and beneﬁts prior to
behavioural reactions or stated intentions. Examples of empirical
research include the study of privacy concerns and risk and beneﬁt
trade-offs on consumers' intention to engage in e-commerce
transactions (Dinev & Hart, 2006), the selection of online retailers
(Potoglou, Patil, Gijon, Palacios, & Feijoo, 2013; Tsai, Egelman,
Cranor, & Acquisti, 2010) and individuals' willingness to disclose
information to retailers under certain privacy conditions or sce-
narios (Hui et al., 2007). Some empirical studies have attempted to
operationalise the APCO model through the analysis of data
capturing antecedents, privacy concerns and behavioural reactions
(e.g. Chen, Beaudoin, & Hong, 2017; Heirman, Walrave, Ponnet, &
Van Gool, 2013; Potoglou et al., 2015).
The principal aim of this study falls within the Privacy Calculus
in the APCO model as it seeks to better understand individual
preferences (reactions) relative to variations of features regarding
privacy-related risks/costs and beneﬁts across the EU27. The over-
arching theory that guides this investigation is Social Exchange
Theory, which postulates that individuals (rationally) minimise
costs and maximise beneﬁts (or rewards) through the comparison
of alternatives when considering decisions involving social trans-
actions in both economic and social outcomes (Bergstr€om, 2015;
Homans, 1958). Social Exchange Theory incorporates assumptions
also found in rational choice theory. The SPDCE designed in this
project helps operationalise Social Exchange Theory by employing
methods and approaches based on Random Utility Theory
(McFadden, 1974) - as explained in Sections 3.4 and 4.2. The
employed approach goes beyond opinion polls or traditional psy-
chometric scales and helps to provide a more nuanced insight into
the individual preferences by allowing several dimensions of risks
and beneﬁts to be controlled for simultaneously.
Given the context dependent nature of privacy (Nissembaum,
2010), this study placed online privacy in the context of in-
dividuals choosing an Internet Service Provider (ISP). The concept
of subscribing to an ISP is similar to subscribing to a utility (e.g.
choosing between two energy providers), which meant re-
spondents had a better likelihood of relating to the scenario. It also
rendered the explanation of relevant security and privacy aspects
more accessible. The speciﬁc research questions this study seeks to
address are as follows:
 Would respondents accept ISP storing their routine Internet use
such as email, browsing, location and personal contacts?
 To what extent respondents would accept an ISP storing their
Internet activity for a period longer than one (1) month?
 Would respondents accept an ISP sharing their Internet activity
with authorities at the national, European or Worldwide levels? Under which circumstances they would accept an ISP allowing
continuous surveillance of their Internet activity by authorities?
 Do respondents place any importance (value) on Privacy
Enhancing Technologies and Services that may be offered by
ISPs?
 Finally, do preferences vary across respondents and are there
any signiﬁcant variations in preferences across members of the
EU27?3. Methods
3.1. Study participants
The data in this study come from a pan-European survey on the
public perception of privacy and security conducted as part of the
PACT project (Public perception of Security and privacy: Assessing
knowledge, Collecting evidence, Translating research into action), a
3-year research project funded by European Union's 7th Frame-
work Programme, a research and technological development
funding programme for 2007e2013 in Europe.
The primary aim of the project was to assess Europeans' pref-
erences between security and privacy. The project focused on three
easily recognised real-life situations that collectively: covered
different types of security threats, involved different actors and
policy sectors and captured a variety of themes relating to privacy
and surveillance including dignity, liberty, state security, personal-
physical security and security of personal information (Solove,
2010). These situations included: travel by metro/rail (Patil,
Patruni, Potoglou, & Robinson, 2016), handling and use of health-
related personal data (Patil, Lu, Saunders, Potoglou, & Robinson,
2016) and Internet-user activity and related data. This latter sce-
nario is the focus of this paper.
The target sample in this study was adults aged 18 years or older
across the EU27 as the study was conceived and designed prior to
Croatia joining the European Union (see, Section 3.5 for details). A
summary of the sample characteristics in this study is shown in
Table 1.
3.2. Development of the survey questionnaire
The development of the survey questionnaire and the SPDCE
were informed by preliminary discussions amongst the consortium
members, stakeholder consultations, expert interviews and focus
groups conducted in the UK, Lithuania and Greece (Patil, Robinson,
& Potoglou, 2012; Potoglou, Robinson, Hellgren, Kobzar, & Patil,
2014a). The questionnaire comprised three sections: (1) de-
mographic questions, (2) attitudes towards privacy concerns when
using the Internet, and (3) the SPDCE scenarios involving
Table 1
Sample characteristics (N ¼ 16,463).
Number of respondents (%) Country Survey mode Language(s) Number of respondents (%)
Gender Austria Online German 707 (4.3)
Males 8121 (49.3) Belgium Online French, Dutch 769 (4.7)
Females 8342 (50.7) Bulgaria Face-to-face Bulgarian 442 (2.7)
Age (years) Cyprus Face-to-face Greek 455 (2.8)
18 to 24 2190 (13.3) Czech Republic Face-to-face Czech 594 (3.6)
25 to 34 3347 (20.3) Denmark Online Danish 694 (4.2)
35 to 44 3366 (20.5) Estonia Online Estonian 744 (4.5)
45 to 54 2948 (17.9) Finland Online Finnish 707 (4.3)
55e64 2437 (14.8) France Online France 735 (4.5)
65 þ 2175 (13.2) Germany Mixed German 647 (3.9)
Household income Greece Face-to-face Greek 435 (2.6)
< V500 1834 (11.1) Hungary Face-to-face Hungarian 530 (3.2)
V500 up to V1500 5079 (30.9) Ireland Online English 692 (4.2)
V1500 up to V3000 4220 (25.6) Italy Mixed Italian 646 (3.9)
V3000 up to V9000 2828 (17.2) Latvia Face-to-face Latvian, Russian 561 (3.4)
More than V9000 168 (1.0) Lithuania Face-to-face Lithuanian 634 (3.9)
Missing/Not stated 2334 (14.2) Luxembourg Online French, German, Luxembourgish 542 (3.3)
Survey Approach Malta Face-to-face Maltese 397 (2.4)
Online 8475 (51) Netherlands Online Dutch 761 (4.6)
Ofﬂine 7988 (49) Poland Face-to-face Polish 554 (3.4)
Weekly personal Internet-use Portugal Face-to-face Portuguese 430 (2.6)
20 h or more 4304 (26.1) Romania Face-to-face Romanian 402 (2.4)
Up to 20 h 2375 (72.1) Slovakia Face-to-face Slovak 606 (3.7)
No access 285 (1.7) Slovenia Face-to-face Slovenian 655 (4.0)
Used the internet before Spain Online Spanish 723 (4.4)
'Yes, by myself' 15,935 (96.8) Sweden Online Swedish 688 (4.2)
'Yes, with someone's help' 528 (3.2) United Kingdom Online English 713 (4.3)
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questionnaire was carried out through cognitive interviews in the
UK, Hungary and Portugal (Patil, Robinson, Potoglou, Burge, &
Hellgren, 2013b). The primary aim of the cognitive interviews
was to ensure that respondents understood the SPDCE scenarios.
Pilot surveys were additionally conducted in Denmark, Italy and
Romania (Patil, Hui, Patruni, Potoglou, & Robinson, 2012). The
survey questionnairewas translated into 24 languages to include all
the ofﬁcial language(s) in each of the EU27 member states.
3.3. Attitudes towards data protection and individual security
concerns
As part of the survey, respondents' concerns regarding data
protection, national and individual security, internet surveillance
and trust inwebsites were captured through 5 sets of psychometric
scales. The statements shown in Table 2 corresponded to previously
validated scales (Buchanan, Paine, Joinson, & Reips, 2007; Dinev &
Hart, 2006) with the exception of the scales in 'Concern for Internet
Surveillance and Trust in Websites', which were developed as part
of this study (Patil et al., 2013b). Survey participants also provided
information about their age, gender and household income.
3.4. Stated-preference scenarios of internet service provider
The design of the SPDCE scenarios was informed by the Privacy
Calculus concept (Dinev & Hart, 2006; Smith et al., 2011), a theo-
retical framework that embodies the assumption that consumers'
behavioural reactions or stated intentions e including their will-
ingness to disclose information e occur following a calculus be-
tween risks/costs and beneﬁts as a consequence of that reaction.
Thus, the SPDCE approach helped to examine a range of hypotheses
covering individuals' preferences relating to security, surveillance
and privacy. The hypotheses also covered broader societal and
socio-economic issues that can affect these preferences (Patil,
Fuchs, Potoglou, & Robinson, 2013a).
Each respondent was presented with ﬁve different choice cards(choice scenarios) in the format shown in Fig. 2. To introduce the
choice experiment, respondents were asked to imagine that they
were about to purchase (or renew) an Internet connection with an
Internet Service Provider. Each card included two ISP options with
different privacy-related conﬁgurations and respondents were
asked to choose the one they would prefer the most. The opt-out
option allowed respondents not to choose any of the ISP on offer
thus allowing them to decline choosing an undesired alternative.
In line with Privacy Calculus concept, potential risks to privacy
include collection and type of information, handling errors, unau-
thorised secondary use (e.g. third party access and sharing) and
improper access to personal information. To capture the above el-
ements in the context of Internet use in the SPDCE, we introduced
relevant attributes referring to: the type of and retention-time of
users' Internet-activity that would be stored, the breadth of access
to that information e e.g. whether information remained with the
ISP, was shared with authorities in the country of residence or
across Europe and ﬁnally, whether potentially continuous surveil-
lance was authorised or unauthorised (see, Fig. 2 and Table 3). The
data-storage attributes described above relate to individuals' will-
ingness to render information, which are commonly seen in the
context of social networking sites and e-commerce, where in-
centives for disclosure may also be implied or offered (Potoglou
et al., 2015).
An additional attribute, 'how long information is stored',
captured preferences for Internet-activity data retention by the ISP.
While data retention is a well-developed topic in the area of law
enforcement (Crump, 2003), citizens' reactions and preferences are
less well-known, especially in the context of Internet surveillance.
This experiment presents an opportunity to test respondents'
preferences regarding data retention. As shown in Table 3, the
possibilities for data retention by an Internet Service Provider in the
experiment ranged from 1 month up to 5 years.
Authorised or unauthorised surveillance and storage of users'
Internet-use information by an ISP pertains directly to information
privacy. Users may seemingly balance the convenience of some
data being stored against the possibility of misuse or
Fig. 2. An example of the Internet Service Provider choice card (Patil et al., 2013b).
Table 2
Concerns on data protection, security, surveillance and trust.
Observations
(Total)
% Concerned or
very concerned
(Internet) Data protection concern (source: Dinev & Hart, 2006)
Your information such as age, gender,
location shared with websites or
companies which you don't use
16287 52.5
Your internet usage information
(including details of items you
searched or purchased) shared with
websites or companies which you
don't use (third-party)
16267 54.8
Your personal information is not
handled in a legitimate way (for
example, the personal information
you provided when opening an
account with a website is not deleted
when you closed the account).
16208 62.0
Concern for internet surveillance (source: Patil et al., 2013b)
Your private conversations on the
internet being monitored
16238 55.0
Your internet usage monitored by a
police department in a different
country
16150 48.3
Public security concern (source: Buchanan et al., 2007)
Use of internet by terrorists for
training and planning attacks
16230 46.2
Use of internet for creating panic and/
or spreading hatred
16294 47.3
Use of internet to share and publish
child pornography
16295 68.2
Use of internet to perpetrate
organised crime
16285 59.5
Individual security concern (source: Dinev & Hart, 2006)
A computer virus which harms your
computer
16315 61.6
Harassment or threatening
comments on internet
16290 34.1
Theft of ﬁnancial data (such as credit
card information) or identity theft
and theft of personal information to
be used for impersonating [you]
16328 61.4
Trust in websites (source: Patil et al.,
2013b)
% Agree or
strongly agree
Most internet websites are safe
environments in which to exchange
information with others
16057 27.7
Most internet websites are reliable
environments in which to conduct
business transactions
15883 30.7
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way can be considered to infringe personal security as it could lead
to identity theft, for example. This is distinct from national security
concerns, however, which involve surveillance of and access to
personal information by security authorities. For the purposes of
this study, we deﬁned 'police' as including all security authorities
likely to need to or perform this kind of surveillance as this was
better understood by all participants. Indeed, this kind of access
may well be outside the control of an ISP, although for consistency
we frame the question in terms of a service offered by them.
ISP options also varied according to the level of access that se-
curity authorities (e.g. at the national or pan-European level) could
have on Internet-user data and whether continuous monitoring of
Internet use could occur. The latter was captured by the attribute
'when ISP can allow continuous surveillance of its Internet users by
the police' (see Table 3). In the most restrictive, privacy-protective
case, as also shown in Table 3, an ISP would store no information
related to Internet use and never allow continuous surveillance of
its customers by the police (i.e., security authorities).
Potential beneﬁts for Internet users involved monetarydiscounts or ISP services that help improve control of their personal
information and their Internet activity. Internet service providers
may offer services to improve their customers' experience and help
them address issues around online privacy. Such services may
involve advice, warning or actively encrypting user information.
These types of services are also offered commercially. As experience
with websites may vary across the EU27, framing the survey
questions at the level of the ISP provides a context for examining all
these issues whilst also as comprehensible as possible for survey
respondents. As shown in Table 3, the corresponding levels of this
attribute included: no additional services, advice on how to use
Internet anonymously, warning the user which websites do not
meet their desired level of privacy or the ISP actively hiding infor-
mation about their internet use from others.
By presenting a set of services offered by an ISP, it was also
possible to attach a cost element with each choice. The premium/
discount values ranged between a discount of 3 Euros permonth up
to a payment of 1 Euro per month and included a 'no charge' level.
As with all attributes, the range and values (levels) presented as
part of the 'premium or discount for Internet security and data
management' attribute were speciﬁed following consultation with
an expert panel and focus-group sessions conducted in London
(UK), Athens (Greece) and Vilnius (Latvia). Smaller price de-
nominations were avoided as the potential information gain may
have been disproportionate to the cost of the survey (e.g. larger
number of scenarios). The chosen levels and subsequent model
speciﬁcation provided sufﬁcient range to estimate the marginal
utility of premiums, discounts and the 'no charge' level within the
range of discount and premium values introduced in the
experiment.
Given the large number of possible alternatives that could be
generated from combinations of the levels of the six attributes
describing ISP options, we used a D-efﬁcient experimental design
based on the multinomial logit model (MNL) to search for a
candidate subset of alternative conﬁgurations to create a design
matrix. Efﬁcient designs require prior information (‘priors’) on the
model parameters to be estimated and these priors are usually
obtained from previous studies. Given that this was the ﬁrst time
that such experiment was developed efﬁcient-design matrices
were generated assuming that priors were equal to zero (Bliemer &
Rose, 2009; Huber & Zwerina, 1996). The design matrix was
generated using the software Ngene (ChoiceMetrics, 2010) and
incorporated a blocking algorithm to reduce the choice scenarios to
a feasible number for each participant. Thus, each respondent in the
Internet context was presented with ﬁve choice cards.
Table 3
Attributes and levels for conﬁgurations used in the Internet Service Provider choice
context (Patil et al., 2013b).
Attribute [Level] Description
Which internet usage information
is stored
[1] No information will be stored
(Reference Level)
[2] Websites you have visited
[3] Websites visited and your location
[4] Websites visited, your location, and list
of persons you contact on the Internet
[5] All internet activities including what
you write in emails or type on websites
How long information is stored [1] 1 month (Reference Level)
[2] 6 months
[3] 1 year
[4] 5 years
Who has access to your information
(if seen needed by judge/court)
[1] Information will not be shared with
anyone else (Reference Level)
[2] Information could only be shared with
the police departments in [Home Country]
[3] Information could be shared with all
European police departments
[4] Information could be shared with
police departments worldwide
When an ISP can allow continuous
surveillance of its Internet users
by the police
[1] Any time without a warrant
[2] Only with a warrant
[3] Without a warrant but only under
government declared state of emergency
[4] Never (Reference Level)
Services offered to improve online
privacy
[1] ISP will not offer any service to improve
your online privacy (Reference Level)
[2] ISP will advise on how to use the
Internet anonymously without allowing
websites to collect your personal data
[3] ISP will warn you which websites do
not meet your desired level of privacy
[4] ISP will actively hide information on
your internet use from others
Monthly cost or discount for
internet security and data
management
[1] You receive a 3 Euros discount
[2] You receive a 1 Euro discount
[3] There is no impact on price
[4] You pay a 1 Euro premium
2 http://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-data-service/survey-series/standard-
special-eb/sampling-and-ﬁeldwork/.
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The survey instrument was deployed across the EU27 with the
aim of recruiting 1000 participants aged 18 years and older in each
country, In Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta due to their smaller
population sizes, the target for each country was set at 750 par-
ticipants (Johnson & Lucica, 2013b). Internet surveys were con-
ducted across 12 countries with the highest levels of Internet access
according to ofﬁcial statistical data (Eurostat, 2013). Face-to-face
interviews were carried out in the remaining 13 countries with
the lowest Internet-access rates. In Italy and Germany, the survey
was conducted by employing a mixed-mode approach e i.e., 500
responses were collected online and 500 interviews were con-
ducted face-to-face. This approach enabled validity testing against
the survey mode.
The main-survey data collection was carried out between
August and November 2013. In countries where the survey was
carried out online, respondents were recruited from online panels
in each country. The sampling design was structured by nationally
representative quotas, resembling the proﬁle of the general popu-
lation in each country according to age, gender and region of resi-
dence. In countries where the survey was conducted using face-to-
face interviews, the sampling approach followed a three-step
approach: (a) stratiﬁcation and selection of local area sampling
points, (b) selection of addresses within each of the sampling points
and (c) selection of individuals within each household. Followingthis process, households were then selected through a predeﬁned
random walk procedure. This is a standard approach followed in
previous pan-European surveys such as the Eurobarometer2.
Within an identiﬁed household, respondents were selected ac-
cording to quotas, reﬂecting the proﬁle of the general population in
each country according to age and gender (either crossed quotas or
simple quotas, depending upon local procedures in each country).
Only one respondent was interviewed in each household (Johnson
& Lucica, 2013a).
Eligible respondents in the Internet-user activity scenarios re-
ported in this paper were those who had previously used the
Internet either by themselves or with someone's help, but did not
necessarily have access to the Internet at the time of the survey.
This respondent-screening approach excluded respondents who
had never used the Internet before but did collect preferences from
a small proportion of participants who at the time had no access to
the Internet (285 respondents or 1.7% of the sample, see Table 1).4. Analysis
4.1. Privacy concern index
Using the ﬁrst two sets of questions in Table 2, an abstract
‘Internet Privacy Index’ was developed to capture respondents'
level of concern for data protection and privacy when using the
Internet. The Index classiﬁed respondents into four groups
depending on the number of ‘concerned’ responses reﬂecting:
 'high concern' when respondents gave 4 or 5 'concerned'
answers;
 'medium concern' when respondents gave 3 'concerned'
answers;
 'low concern' where respondents gave 1 or 2 'concerned' an-
swers, and
 'no concern' when no concern answers were reported.
This procedure was in the line with the development of similar
indices that have been validated using large panels across different
countries such as the Westin-Harris Distrust Index (Kumaraguru &
Cranor, 2005).4.2. Analysis of stated preferences for surveillance, data retention
and privacy enhancing services
The analysis of the SPDEC data corresponding to respondents'
choices in the Internet Service Provider scenarios was conducted
using the multinomial logit model (MNL), a discrete choice analysis
method based on Random Utility Theory (RUT) (McFadden, 1974).
Under RUT, a consumer n by choosing alternative-option i (i.e., an
Internet Service Provider) maximises their utility Uin, which rep-
resents the level of 'satisfaction'/beneﬁt from choosing that option.
The Utility is the sum of a deterministic (observed) part Vin and a
random (unobserved) part εin (McFadden, 1974):
Uin ¼ Vin þ εin ¼ b
0
*xin þ d
0
*zn þ εin (1)
Vin is a linear-in parameters function of the attributes of the
alternatives x and individuals z;
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representing the inﬂuence of attributes of the alternatives and
individuals, respectively;
εin is a random parameter that incorporates unobserved or un-
observable attributes, unobserved taste variations and mea-
surement or speciﬁcation errors (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985).
Given that the formulation of the Utility in Eq. (1) includes a
stochastic component, it is only possible to describe the probability
of choosing alternative i over another alternative k as:
Pin ¼ ProbðVin þ εin >Vkn þ εkn;ck2CÞ
¼ ProbðVin  Vkn > εkn  εinÞ (2)
where C is the choice set and corresponds to the set of the alter-
native options that are available to an individual n. Assuming that
the random part, εin, is Type I Extreme Value independently and
identically distributed across alternatives, the probability of
choosing alternative i takes the form of themultinomial logit model
(McFadden, 1974)3:
Pin ¼
exp

b0*xin þ d0*zn

P
jexp

b0*xjn þ d0*zn
 (3)
The choices made by survey respondents across the different
sets of alternative scenarios allowed the estimation of the param-
eters b0 and d0 and subsequently, the estimation of the probability
that an ISP i is chosen among the set of two ISPs. In order to capture
variation in preferences due to differences across countries and
groups of respondents we used segmentation analysis so that
country-speciﬁc and socio-demographic variables were introduced
with a separate coefﬁcient into the model (Train, 2003).
The estimated MNL model in this study has been developed
using data from respondents across all EU27 countries. Hence, a
single weight is estimated for each attribute level, which corre-
sponds to the EU average. When pooling data from different
country samples, however, it was necessary to consider potential
variations in unobserved factors or error-variation in the models
between countries. These variations can include measurement er-
rors across samples and other unobserved cultural and contextual
factors. Furthermore, surveys in some countries were carried
out online, while others were undertaken ‘face to face’. These
two types of survey modes may also give rise to variations in
unobserved factors or error-variation in the models, which need
to be controlled for. Accordingly, the variation in quality of
responses across the following two dimensions was taken into
account via:
 Country scales to control for country-speciﬁc unobserved fac-
tors such as difference in quality of data and survey imple-
mentation across the EU27.
 Scales by survey mode to control for variation in response
quality between the online and face-to-face surveys.
Finally, to account for correlations between multiple SPDCE re-
sponses by a single respondent, a panel speciﬁcation can be
applied. A panel speciﬁcation, however, increases the model esti-
mation time considerably given the large sample size in this proj-
ect. Hence in order to correct for model mis-speciﬁcation and take
into account the repeated nature of the SP data a bootstrap
resampling procedure was employed on the ﬁnal model (Efron &3 Different assumptions about the distribution of the error terms give rise to
different modelling structures (e.g. probit, mixed logit).Tibshirani, 1994).
5. Results
The total number of participants in the PACT survey across the
EU27 were 26,443 comprising 12,861 online observations and
13,582 observations collected via face-to-face interviews (Patruni
et al., 2014; see Appendix B). The response rates in the face-to-
face interviews varied between 20% (Romania) and 68% (Bulgaria)
(Patruni et al., 2014; see Appendix A). It was not possible to accu-
rately compute the response rate in the online survey as re-
spondents were recruited via an Internet panel. The sample size
satisﬁed set targets and the sample was broadly representative for
each country against age, gender and region of residence, the three
key dimensions that were deﬁned for sample representativeness
(Patruni et al., 2014). In Austria, Estonia and Spain respondents
aged 65 years or older were signiﬁcantly under-represented. Re-
spondents aged 65 years or older were over-represented in Cyprus
andMalta. Additionally, in Malta respondents aged between 55 and
64 years were under-represented. The majority of the respondents
were able to engage with the choice tasks. On average, only 5% of
respondents in the Internet experiment reported being unable to
understand the choice tasks. The available sample size for the
experiment concerning an ISP was 16,463 (62%) respondents, of
which 56% were surveyed online and 44% face-to-face (see also,
Table 1).
5.1. Attitudes and internet privacy concerns across the EU27
Overall, as shown in Table 2, respondents expressed low levels
of trust in the Internet. Approximately, one third of respondents
agreed that websites were safe and reliable and safe environments
to exchange information (27.7%) and conduct business transactions
(30.7%). Some of the highest levels of concern were expressed
regarding: use of the Internet to share and publish child pornog-
raphy (68.2% were concerned or highly concerned), handling of
personal information (62%), computer viruses that may harm
computers (61.2%), theft of ﬁnancial data (61.4%) and the amount of
personal data collected and stored by internet websites and
internet service providers (60.8%).
Fig. 3 shows the variation in the proportion of respondents
falling into the category of ‘High Concern’ for privacy when using
the Internet across the EU27 according to the ‘Internet Privacy In-
dex’ computed in Section 4.1 (see, Appendix A for country codes).
The highest proportions of respondents with ‘No Concern’ for
Internet privacy were observed in Slovakia and Slovenia, three
Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) and Netherlands.
On the other hand, the highest proportion of respondents with
‘High Concern’ regarding Internet privacy were observed in
Lithuania, Latvia Spain, Greece and Portugal.
5.2. Preferences for privacy, surveillance and privacy enhancing
tools
Estimated coefﬁcients in the MNL model are presented in the
following two tables. Table 4 presents baseline (average) prefer-
ences for ISPs and for different data-privacy conﬁgurations across
the EU27 and Table 5 shows statistically signiﬁcant country-, age-
and education-level-speciﬁc effects. The model also accounts for
measurement errors, survey mode and country-speciﬁc differ-
ences, which are captured by the coefﬁcients reported in Appendix
B.
In Table 4, each coefﬁcient corresponds to the strength of pref-
erence (or weight) that respondents placed upon an attribute level
relative to the reference level of the corresponding attribute. In
Fig. 3. Proportion of respondents with high Internet Privacy Concern Index across the EU27.
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smallest degree of intrusion in terms of information privacy and
surveillance. A positive coefﬁcient means thate all else being equal
e a respondent was more likely to choose a scenario that included
the attribute level attached to the coefﬁcient than its reference level
for which the coefﬁcient was set equal to zero. On the other hand, a
negative coefﬁcient means that e all else being equal e re-
spondents were more likely to choose a scenario involving the
reference level than the attribute level with a negative coefﬁcient.
The interpretation is similar for the coefﬁcients corresponding to
country-speciﬁc and socio-economic and demographic effects. For
example, the coefﬁcients in Table 5 show that respondents aged
between 18 and 34 years and those who only attended primary
education were less likely to choose the 'none' option. Regarding
the ISPs options, within a given attribute (e.g. how long information
is stored), attribute-level coefﬁcients can be compared with each
other and provide the relative magnitude of respondents' strength
of preference (e.g. data retention of 6 months vs.1 year). The results
for each attribute are summarised in the remainder of this section.
5.2.1. Which internet usage information is stored
Across the EU27, and relative to the reference level “no infor-
mation will be stored”, the negative coefﬁcients of the remaining
levels of this attribute indicate that respondents were less likely to
choose an ISP that stored any type of Internet-activity (see, Table 4).
Speciﬁcally, respondents were averse to ISPs storing “websites
visited” (coef: 0.333; p < 0.001), “websites visited and location”(coef: 0.464; p < 0.001), “websites visited, location and personal
contacts” (coef: 0.721; p < 0.001), and “all internet activities
including email content and types of websites” (coef: 0.847;
p < 0.001).
The analysis further helps to uncover differences in respondents'
choices across countries and socio-demographic characteristics. As
shown in Table 5, in the case of storage of Internet-use information,
we found that respondents in Bulgaria, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania
and Latvia exhibited either different preferences or different
strength of preference relative to the rest of the EU27. In particular,
respondents in Finland expressed signiﬁcantly stronger prefer-
ences for the “no information will be stored” level (coef: 0.282;
p < 0.01) and stronger aversion for “all internet activities” level
(coef: 0.353; p < 0.001) when compared to the EU27 average. On
the other hand, preferences for the “no information will be stored”
level were weaker across Bulgaria (coef: 0.609; p < 0.001), Latvia
(coef: 0.682; p < 0.001) and Lithuania (coef: 0.887; p < 0.001).
Fig. 4 summarises these choice patterns showing that re-
spondents in Bulgaria (BG) and Latvia (LV) were in favour of
accepting internet-use storage but up to the point where only
websites and locationwere stored. Contrary to the rest of the EU27,
respondents in Lithuania (LT) were more likely to choose scenarios
that stored any type of information with the highest preference
being for the “websites visited” level. Finally, respondents in Ireland
(IE) were strongly averse to the storage of “all internet activities”
(coef: 0.406; p < 0.001).
With regard to socio-demographic characteristics, women and
Table 4
Model estimates on preferences regarding internet surveillance, data retention and
privacy enhancing services across Europe (baseline group).
Model parameter Estimate t-ratio
Which internet usage information is stored
No information will be stored Reference level
Websites you have visited 0.333*** 7.7
Websites visited and your location 0.464*** 11.4
Websites visited, your location, and list of
persons you contact on the Internet
0.721*** 16.3
All Internet activities including what you
write in emails or type on websites
0.847*** 19.4
How long information is stored
1 month Reference level
6 months 0.122*** 4.6
1 year 0.222*** 7.7
5 years 0.466*** 15.9
Who has access to Internet information
Information will not be shared with anyone
else
Reference level
Information could only be shared with police
departments in [home country]
0.144*** 5.4
Information could be shared with all
European police departments
0.510*** 16.5
Information could be shared with police
departments worldwide
0.644*** 20.2
When ISP can allow continuous surveillance of its Internet users by the
police
Never Reference level
Any time without a warrant 1.059*** 30.2
Only with a warrant 0.153*** 5.4
Without a warrant but only under
government declared state of emergency
0.321*** 11.3
Services offered to improve online privacy
ISP will not offer any service to improve your
online privacy
Reference level
ISP will advise on how to use the Internet
anonymously without allowing websites to
collect your personal data
0.763*** 22.2
ISP will warn youwhich websites do notmeet
your desired level of privacy
0.779*** 22.3
ISP will actively hide information on your
Internet use from others
0.819*** 21.2
Monthly cost or discount for Internet security and data management
Discount * (all income levels) 0.001*** 9.3
There is no impact on price * (all income
levels)
0.389*** 10.9
Cost if household income less than V500 0.003*** 10.8
Cost if household income from V500 to
V1500
0.002*** 14.1
Cost if household income greater than V1500 0.002*** 10.9
Discount * (missing income) 0.001*** 3.3
There is no impact on price * (missing income) 0.060 0.6
Cost (missing income) for low/medium-
income countries
0.006*** 15.6
Cost (missing income) for high-income
countries
0.004*** 7.8
***: p  0.001; **: 0.001 < p  0.05; *: 0.05 < p < 0.10.
Table 5
Country-, age- and education-level-speciﬁc effects.
Model parameter Country differences
relative to the baseline
group
Socio-demographic
differences relative to
the baseline group
Stronger
preference
Weaker
preference
Stronger
preference
Weaker
preference
Type of Internet-usage information stored
No information will be
stored
Finland
(0.282**)
Bulgaria
(-0.609***)
Latvia
(-0.682***)
Lithuania
(-0.887***)
Females
(-0.112***)
Secondary
education
(-0.130***)
Website you have visited 18-24 year
olds
(0.282***)
All Internet activities Finland
(-0.353***)
Ireland
(-0.406***)
How long Internet data are stored
1 year Latvia
(0.346**)
Who has access to Internet information
Worldwide Slovenia
(0.495***)
Luxembourg
(-0.241**)
When ISP can allow continuous surveillance of its Internet users by the
police
Never Malta
(-0.811***)
65þ year
olds
(-0.122**)
Any time without a warrant Lithuania
(-1.061***)
Only with a warrant Denmark
(0.374***)
Spain
(0.531***)
Without a warrant but only
under government
declared state of
emergency
Lithuania
(-0.900***)
55e64
year olds
(-0.122**)
Services offered to improve online privacy
ISP will not offer any service
to improve your online
privacy
Slovakia
(0.362***)
Czech
Republic
(0.619***)
Estonia
(-0.271***)
Belgium
(-0.305***)
Males
(0.250***)
65þ year
olds
(-0.200***)
None of these options 18e24
year olds
(-0.392***)
25e34
year olds
(-0.153***)
Primary
education
(-0.137***)
***: p  0.001; **: 0.001 < p  0.05; *: 0.05 < p < 0.10.
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lower strength of preference for the “no information will stored”
level and thus they were more likely to opt-in for scenarios that
involved some type of internet-use storage. On the other hand,
respondents aged 18e24 years were more likely to choose sce-
narios that involved storage of “websites visited” relative to the
reference level (“no information will be stored”).
5.2.2. How long information is stored
Similar to preferences regarding internet-use storage, re-
spondents across the EU27 were on average less likely to choose an
ISP that stored data on users' Internet activity for a period longer
than one month, the reference level in the experiment. Only re-
spondents in Latvia were in favour of an ISP retaining data onInternet-use for up to one year.
5.2.3. Who has access to your information (if seen needed by judge/
court)
Relative to the reference level “information will not be shared
with anyone else”, respondents were averse to scenarios under
which an ISP would share Internet-use data with “police de-
partments in the home country” (coef: 0.144; p < 0.001), “police
departments across Europe” (coef: 0.510; p < 0.001) or “police
departments worldwide” (coef: 0.644; p < 0.001). Increasing ab-
solute values of the coefﬁcients for those attribute levels shows that
respondents were increasingly averse as the geographic scale of
access increased. The level of aversion for worldwide access to
Fig. 4. Strength of preference for the type of information stored by ISP.
Fig. 5. Strength of preference for allowing continuous surveillance.
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(coef: 0.241; p < 0.05). On the other hand, Slovenia was the only
country where respondents were more likely to choose ISPs if the
Internet-use data were to be shared with police departments
worldwide (coef: 0.495; p < 0.001).5.2.4. When an ISP can allow continuous surveillance of its internet
users by the police
With regard to the conditions under which ISPs should allow
continuous surveillance of Internet users, a different picture
emerged. On average and across the EU27, respondents were more
likely to choose ISPs that allowed continuous surveillance 'only
with awarrant' (coef:0.153; p < 0.001) over ISPs that would 'never
allow continuous surveillance'. On the other hand, respondents
were less likely to opt-in for an ISP that would either allow
continuous surveillance 'without a warrant' (coef: 1.059;
p < 0.001) or in the case of 'government-declared state of emer-
gency or at any time without a warrant' (coef: 0.321; p < 0.001).
As shown in Table 4, model estimates showed that respondents
across Denmark, Malta, Spain and Lithuania expressed signiﬁcantly
different preferences compared to the remaining EU countries.
These patterns are shown in more detail in Fig. 5. Danish and
Spanish respondents expressed a stronger than average positive
preference for ISPs that 'allowed continuous surveillance only with
a warrant'. On the other hand, respondents in Lithuania expressed
stronger aversion to higher levels of oversight of Internet users than
the EU average. Respondents in Malta were more likely to choose
ISPs that would allow continuous surveillance either with awarrant
or under government-declared state of emergency; the latter was
contrary to the EU-average preferences.
Regarding differences in preferences based on the socio-
demographic proﬁles of respondents, we found that respondentsaged 65 years and over were overall less averse to continuous
surveillance with or without warrant than other age groups. On
other hand, those aged 54e64 years were less likely to choose ISPs
that allowed continuous surveillance without a warrant under a
government-declared state of emergency. Finally, respondents over
the age of 65 years had overall stronger preferences across all
attribute-levels relative to other age groups.
5.2.5. Services offered to improve online privacy
As shown in Table 4, respondents were generally in favour of
ISPs that offered privacy enhancing services including 'advice on
how to use the Internet anonymously' (coef: 0.763; p < 0.001),
'warning which websites do not meet users' desired level of pri-
vacy' (coef: 0.779; p < 0.001) and 'actively hiding information from
others', which received the highest strength of preference among
these offered services (coef: 0.819; p < 0.001).
The strength of preferences was signiﬁcantly stronger than
average across Belgium and Estonia, while respondents in the
Czech Republic and Slovakia expressed weaker (though overall still
positive) preferences for these services. All else being equal, sig-
niﬁcant differences in preferences were found according to gender
and age. Males were more likely to opt-in for ISPs that offered no
services to improve online privacy whereas respondents aged 65 or
older were less likely to choose those options and were more likely
to opt-in for ISPs that offered privacy-enhancing services compared
to other age groups.
5.2.6. Surcharge on and reduction of monthly fees
As shown in Table 4, some of the ISP choice options were
designed to include a premium to enhance users' Internet-security.
Respondents' sensitivity to cost was modelled as a linear variable
by estimating separate effects according to respondents' monthly
household-income (after taxes) thus capturing decreasing cost
sensitivity with increasing income. Adjacent income bands were
grouped when the coefﬁcients were not statistically different thus
resulting into three income groups with signiﬁcantly different cost
sensitivity: (a) less than V500, (b) V500 to 1,500, and (c) over
V1500.
A separate coefﬁcient was also estimated for the group of re-
spondents for whom income was not recorded ('missing income')
who answered, ‘prefer not to say’ or ‘don't know’ to the income
question. Respondents in the 'missing income' group were further
split into two groups (low/medium and high income countries) to
account for the wide range of average income across the EU27.
Thus, our model captures cost sensitivity across ﬁve income-based
population segments. The estimated coefﬁcients indicate that
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charge to cover security and as shown in Table 4, respondents'
sensitivity to cost decreased with increasing income.
The discount variable was also speciﬁed as a linear variable.
However, no signiﬁcant difference in sensitivity for discounts was
observed for respondents with different income. For respondents
who did not state their income, model speciﬁcation tests were also
undertaken to examine if the discount variable could be split into
different categories based on the average income of the country of
residence. The tests did not show a signiﬁcant difference in sensi-
tivity of the discount coefﬁcient by the average income of the
country. Hence only two discount coefﬁcients are reported in
Table 4; one for missing income and another for all other income
levels.
All else being equal, respondents were more likely to choose
ISPs that would not charge any security premiums, except those
who did not report their income, and were more likely to prefer
ISPs that offered discounts. The negative marginal utility placed on
ISPs offering a discount by respondents who reported their income
(coef: 0.001; p < 0.001) may be due to the disparity between
willingness to accept payment to disclose personal information
(discount) and willingness to pay to protect their personal infor-
mation (Acquisti et al., 2013). Put differently, respondents might
feel that the discount on offer may not have been enough for them
to disclose their Internet activity and related aspects in the exper-
iment. Finally, it is worth noting that the ﬁndings on premium/
discount coefﬁcients does not mean that the 'no charge' option
dominated respondents' choices. If that were the case, it would not
have been possible to estimate any signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for the
remaining attributes in the experiment.
6. Discussion and conclusion
This pan-European study examined Internet-user privacy con-
cerns and preferences for privacy, surveillance and privacy-
enhancing services across the EU27. Using the Privacy Calculus
concept, respondents were presented with alternative options of
ISPs involving varying levels of data storage, retention and sharing
of these data with authorities. Options also involved scenarios in
which continuous surveillance of users' Internet activity might
occur or ISPs might offer potential beneﬁts such as privacy-
enhancing advice or technologies to help users protect their pri-
vacy while using the Internet.
The ﬁndings showed that, on average, respondents across the
EU27 were less likely to choose ISPs that retained data for more
than one month and shared any type of data related to their
Internet activity (e.g. websites, location, emails). These ﬁndings
provide a robust evidence base that challenge recent policy initia-
tives to enable enforcement agencies to more easily access a user's
Internet activity. For example, in 2015, the UK Home Ofﬁce pro-
posed a law, the Investigatory Powers Bill, whichwould require ISPs
to store internet activity of all users in Britain and allow law
enforcement agencies without a warrant to access information of
websites users visited over the period of one year (BBC, 2015). The
above ﬁndings regarding retention of data imply that EU Member
States and subsequently ISPs should be transparent and should
establish a 'right to be informed' when users are subject to such
measures (de Hert & Boehm, 2012).
The analysis of preferences also uncovered signiﬁcant effects of
preference heterogeneity according to respondents' age, gender
and education qualiﬁcations. For example, women were less likely
to opt-in for ISPs that did not store any information relative to men
e women were thus willing to disclose some of their Internet ac-
tivity to ISPs. Although there were no signiﬁcant gender differences
in terms of respondents' willingness to allow ISPs to store emails,location and contacts, this ﬁnding is broadly in line with ﬁndings of
a meta-analysis of 205 studies on gender differences and self-
disclosure which showed that women disclose more information
than men (Dindia & Allen, 1992). Gender differences in self-
disclosure may arise from differences on how individuals social-
ise, gender-role expectations and the different criteria men and
women use to deﬁne and control personal information (Petronio,
2002 cited in; Sheldon, 2013).
It is not straightforward to contrast differences in preferences
according to age as most studies employ convenience samples
targeting younger participants. In this study,18e24-year olds were
more likely to choose ISPs that stored websites visited and 55e64-
year olds were strongly against ISPs that would allow continuous
surveillance without warrant. Confounding this prior evidence, it is
worth highlighting that those aged 65 and over were less likely to
choose ISPs that would never allow continuous surveillance.
Broadly, these ﬁndings are consistent with previous studies that
showed that privacy concerns may decrease with age (Bergstr€om,
2015; Taddicken, 2014). The latter may arise from a general lack
of trust in the Internet, stemming from different perceptions about
the credibility of online information. This has been shown to be a
factor in healthcare (e.g. Zulman, Kirch, Zheng, & An, 2011). A
further potential explanation could lie in the fact that those over
working age are more likely to read about and thus be appraised of
government surveillance activities reported by the media.
Concerning levels of educational attainment, our study showed
that those who only completed secondary education (i.e., without a
university degree) were less likely to choose an ISP that stored no
data. This ﬁnding raises interesting questions: (a) was this prefer-
ence due to implicit trust that the storage of information would be
in line with privacy preferences? or (b) were people with lower
levels of educational attainment less likely to question the need for
surveillance and more likely to take at face value the necessity of
the potential trade-offs between privacy and security as articulated
by governments when disclosing surveillance practices? This
ﬁnding is supported by the work of Davis and Silver (2004) who
note the relevancy of educational levels when considering prefer-
ences regarding surveillance.
Findings also point towards signiﬁcant country-level differences
from the average preferences at the EU27 level. For example, re-
spondents in Lithuania and Bulgaria were in favour of ISPs col-
lecting information on websites visited and the location of users.
Additionally, respondents in Latvia were more likely to opt-in to
ISPs collecting all types of Internet activity including email com-
munications and retaining these data for up to year. Respondents in
Slovenia were content with ISPs sharing Internet usage activity
with security authorities worldwide. There could be several reasons
why preferences in some countries were contrary to the EU27
average. One such reason could be the history of surveillance and
its place in culture. Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia
belonged to the block of Central and Eastern European countries
where state surveillance was endemic for a number of years
(Svenonius, Bjorklund, & Waszkeiwicz, 2014). From a cultural
perspective and according to Hofstede's Dimensions of National
Culture, Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania have similarities in terms of
exhibiting quite low scores on the 'Indulgence' dimension implying
that individuals' actions are 'restrained' by social norms (Hofstede,
2017). Slovenians' preferences towards sharing their Internet ac-
tivity with security authorities worldwide may be part the coun-
try's tendency to follow the 'Western prototype' and globalisation,
recognising that the 'security landscape is changing profoundly'
and boundaries between security actors disappear (Zavrs^nik, 2013).
These ﬁndings are in line with prior suggestions to researchers
when conducting ﬁeldwork to place emphasis on the consumers'
cultural background due to its potential to moderate attitudes
D. Potoglou et al. / Computers in Human Behavior 75 (2017) 811e825822towards online privacy (Pavlou& Chai, 2002). Another factor which
may reﬂect signiﬁcantly different preferences include possible
media events on surveillance contemporaneous to the ﬁeldwork.
Nonetheless, the ﬁndings also demonstrate that heterogeneity of
preferences across the EU27 has implications towards the devel-
opment and implementation of European-level policy and legisla-
tion on data protection. The ﬁndings also point towards
empowerment of the individual in terms of being able to control
their data and thus addressing inequalities between individuals
and global corporations such as ISPs (in 't Veld, 2012).
A related aspect which merits discussion is the public-private
aspect to surveillance and the way in which the private sector,
wittingly or unwittingly assists governments in performing sur-
veillance. In the aftermath of the disclosures by Edward Snowden
regarding government surveillance capabilities, the private sector
were quick to point out the damage that such revelations would
have upon their customer base, eroding trust (Amnesty
International, 2015). Although this study implicitly considered the
role of the private sector (in terms of ISPs that respondents were
asked to choose from) we did not explore the legal obligations and
behaviour of the ISP toward security authorities in respect of
honouring requests for users' personal information (whether
covered by a warrant or not). Similarly, we did not explore the ISPs
willingness (or not) to install government surveillance technology
on their own infrastructure.
Respondents did recognise that the Internet can be a platform
for child pornography, terrorism and fraud. Thus, they do recognise
that continuous surveillance of users' activity may be useful to law
enforcement in tackling these types of misuse or malfeasance, but
doing so requires a legal basis. Interestingly, the ﬁndings showed
that, all else being equal and when compared to an ISP option that
would not allow continuous surveillance under any circumstances,
respondents were more likely to choose an ISP that would allow
continuous surveillance providing it was suitably accountable (i.e.,
when a warrant was issued). This implies that individuals are able
to make complex trade-offs when they set their own privacy
against broader social beneﬁts (e.g. tackling crime).
The ﬁnding that individuals were willing to opt-in for an ISP
which offered privacy protections imply a nascent market for pri-
vacy enhancing services and PETs. Respondents were more likely to
select an ISP that offered some level of privacy protection relative to
the base scenario which did not offer any service to improve user
privacy. These services were presented in the form of an ISP of-
fering advice or warnings or actively helping users to protect their
anonymity and preventing websites from collecting data. Tech-
nologies offering anonymization of records and logs have been
introduced as 'countermeasures to surveillance' and include TOR,
Free Heaven and Pretty Good Privacy (Shen & Pearson, 2011).
Supply side aspects of the market for privacy enhancing technol-
ogies were historically assessed as being immature (London
Economics, 2010) in part because companies saw little economic
beneﬁt in offering users ways to protect their privacy compared to
the revenue available to them from exploiting it. By comparison,
the ﬁndings indicated above imply that the economic potential has
not yet been fully recognised.
Despite the uniqueness of this study as one of the largest exer-
cises concerning preferences for online surveillance, privacy and
security employing SPDCE and given the geographical scale of the
ﬁeldwork, several challenges were encountered. Firstly, signiﬁcant
time was spent in translating and validating terms into different
languages, especially the terms 'privacy', 'surveillance' and 'secu-
rity' which can be particularly ambiguous and sensitive. Risks that
clumsy translation of such sensitive and context dependent terms
would affect the validity of understanding and presentation of the
survey instrument were mitigated through collaboration with anexperienced and internationally accredited market-research ﬁrm
who applied consistent, industry-recognised standards for inter-
viewing and internet-based research across the EU27.
Secondly, the target sample in the study was adults aged 18
years and over with representative quotas for age, gender and
geographic regions within each of the EU27. For reasons of speed
and efﬁcient use of human and ﬁnancial resources, sampling,
recruitment and data collection differed according to the country's
Internet-access rates. Face-to-face interviews were conducted
across countries with the lowest Internet-access rates and online
surveys were administered across those countries with the highest
Internet-access rates. However, Internet use was not part of the
sampling-quota criteria and hence, Internet-use patterns observed
in both the Internet and face-to-face samples were not necessarily
representative of the country's Internet-user proﬁles and patterns.
The use of mixed-mode methods, however, ensured that the study
collected responses from both regular Internet users but also those
that it is otherwise difﬁcult to recruit via online surveys but do have
some experience in using the Internet. These differences are
controlled for in the results reported in this study.
As in the case with all experimental studies, respondents in the
SPDCE expressed behavioural intentions and not actual choices,
which may be different and change over time. However, this limi-
tation is not prohibitive from revealing the relative importance
individuals place on different levels of surveillance, data retention
and privacy enhancing services or technologies. SPDCEs have been
robust in providing evidence on the relative importance of different
choice-related attributes and have had a long-standing application
in other complex and difﬁculty to quantify subject areas such as
transport (e.g. Hensher, 1994). Most importantly, the ﬁndings in
this study provide a strong evidence base for comparison of indi-
vidual preferences across the EU27 as well as across real-life situ-
ations. The latter is reported by Potoglou et al. (2014b) who discuss
ﬁndings across the travel on metro/rail, healthcare data and
Internet-use scenarios providing empirical evidence regarding the
context dependent nature of preferences regarding privacy, secu-
rity and surveillance. For example, in some situations, privacy is
considered as a form of control of personal information and in
others as control of physical space.
While on average preferences across Europe are broadly
consistent, ﬁndings point toward the importance of accounting for
the diversity in preferences across country and demographic
groups when designing and deploying security and physical or
digital surveillance infrastructure. Europeans' preferences relating
to security and privacy are much more nuanced than a straight-
forward inverse relationship that assumes that enhanced security
or surveillance must come at the cost of privacy and liberty.
Country-speciﬁc models could provide an even greater insight into
variations across the 27 Member States.
In conclusion, this work provides robust and consistent evi-
dence from across the EU27, which points towards: the need for
greater transparency and accountability regarding the surveillance
of Internet use by law enforcement agencies, the need to empower
individuals to set the right level of privacy for themselves and
potential business opportunities through exploiting nascent de-
mand for privacy enhancing services and technologies. Given better
communication from governments about the reasons why security
services must employ surveillance capabilities and clarity about the
accountability and governance of these capabilities, coupled with
greater availability of tools to help users better manage their
preferences, the delicate task of managing the competing priorities
of privacy, surveillance and security may be more actively
addressed. Finally, evidence from this study serves to add another
set of insights into the complex and broad picture that security
authorities have to consider in their decision-making.
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